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Lululemon’s commitment to the
environment
A tangle of seaweed, suppliers, and social
responsibility
A. Erin Bass and Rebecca J. Morris

It was the morning of Wednesday, November 14, 2007. The article on the front page of the New York Times Business
Section read ‘“Seaweed” clothing has none, tests show.’ The story asserted that one of Lululemon’s product lines,
Vitasea®, which purported to contain a seaweed fiber designed to release marine amino acids, minerals, and vitamins
into the skin upon contact with moisture, contained no such element. Both Chip Wilson, Chairman and Founder of
athletic wear retailer Lululemon, and Robert Meers, Lululemon’s CEO, were about to embark on their first damagecontrol mission since the company’s Initial Public Offering in July. This was the most widespread negative press
Lululemon had received since going public, and the aftermath of the article would question Lululemon’s product
integrity, marketing and strategy, suppliers, and ethics. Lululemon’s next move would be crucial to both its survival and
reputation.

Lululemon’s background
Lululemon Athletica Inc. (Lululemon), a yoga-inspired athletic apparel and accessories manufacturer and retailer, was
founded in 1998 in Vancouver, Canada. In 2007, the company owned or franchised 81 stores internationally. See Exhibit
1 for store locations. Lululemon’s mission was – to create components for people to live longer, healthier, and more fun
lives, based on core values of quality, product, integrity, balance, entrepreneurship, greatness, and fun.
Lululemon produced high-quality, innovative products meant to inspire physical activity in yogis and athletes.
The company created a manifesto to capture the essence of the Lululemon culture and inspire customers to consider
changes to improve their own lifestyle. Ideas like ‘a daily hit of athletic-induced endorphins gives you the power to make
better decisions, helps you be at peace with yourself, and offsets stress’; ‘that which matters the most should never give
way to that which matters the least’; and ‘successful people replace the words “wish”, “should” and “try” with “I will”’
were part of the manifesto and part of the Lululemon brand religion. The company targeted ‘super Girls’; the daughters
of the 1980s ‘Power Women’. These educated, hard-working women lived healthy lifestyles by working out, eating
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right, and taking care of themselves. Lululemon opened lines of men’s clothing and accessories, but still remained highly
dedicated to its core market of ‘super Girls’.
Lululemon’s founder, Dennis ‘Chip’ Wilson, graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in Economics from the
University of Calgary in 1980. He founded the surf/skate/snowboard company Westbeach Sports in the early 1990s, and
sold it in 1997. At the age of 41, Chip started taking yoga classes and a year later, in 1998, he opened Lululemon’s first
store in Vancouver’s trendy, upscale neighborhood, Kitsilano Beach. Wilson described his leadership style as ‘run and
let it be run’, desiring a culture of autonomy and accountability among employees. Robert ‘Bob’ Meers joined
Lululemon initially as a consultant in 2005 before accepting the role of CEO. The reorganization allowed Wilson to
retain his positions as company Chairman and Chief Product Designer, while relinquishing his duties as CEO. Meers had
a seasoned background in retail; serving as President of Reebok International and President and CEO of home décor
designer, Syratech Corp.
Lululemon designed and produced technical athletic apparel for yoga, running, and dancing. The company
initially became popular for its well-fitting black workout pants. In addition to workout pants, the company sold workout
bras and tanks, shorts, capri pants, t-shirts, sweatshirts, jackets, and other pieces of apparel for men and women. The
company also produced a line of accessories including water bottles, headgear, yoga mats and accessories, and yoga and
gym bags. Lululemon took pride in using innovative materials to manufacture its products. The company’s most wellknown and often-used fabric was Luon®, a moisture wicking fabric that was used for most of its pants, shorts, tanks, and
bras. A more innovative fabric the company used was Silverescent™, a fabric made with silver yarn, designed to
eliminate bacteria and remove odor from the fabric. The average price for a pair of Lululemon pants was US$99, bra was
US$48, tank was US$5USD, and jacket was UD$98. Lululemon’s line of accessories ranged from water bottles sold for
US$25 to bags as expensive as US$88.
2007 proved to be a financially stellar year for Lululemon. otal assets had more than doubled, from
US$48,492,745 at the beginning of 2007 to US$97,906,418 by the end of the 2007 fiscal year. Net revenue had increased
during the same time period by 45.8%, while net income posted a 75.1% increase. A financial analysis for the company
can be viewed in Exhibit 2. The company continued an aggressive expansion strategy, focused on development of the
Canadian and US markets. Lululemon went public on the Toronto Stock Exchange on July 26, 2007 and was first listed
on the NASDAQ on September 4, 2007 at US$36.87 per share. Stock information can be viewed in Exhibit 3.

Lululemon’s plan for sustainability and corporate social
responsibility
From its inception, Lululemon had extensive plans for incorporating sustainability into the overall strategy of the
organization. Corporate social responsibility was at the heart of Lululemon. The company named its corporate social
responsibility strategy ‘Community Legacy’, and Lululemon’s business processes were centered on the five elements
described in the Community Legacy initiative: community, people, sourcing and manufacturing, efficiency and waste
reduction, and green building and spaces. Lululemon specifically focused on three elements of the Community Legacy
initiative as it related to sustainability: sourcing and manufacturing, efficiency and waste reduction, and green building
and spaces.
Sourcing and manufacturing was developed around a three-year strategy aimed at working with suppliers that
not only shared Lululemon’s vision and values, but that complied with Lululemon’s Workplace Code of Conduct,
developed internally by Lululemon executives. Lululemon was committed to only work with suppliers that were as
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concerned about the environment and human health as Lululemon. The company set a high level of expectations;
therefore suppliers that wanted to work with Lululemon had to meet specific requirements, and were continuously
audited by Lululemon to identify areas of weakness and opportunity. Lululemon created a Social Responsibility
Compliance ranking to assess suppliers and manufacturing partners, and evaluated each partner out of a possible score of
100. The scorecard was broken down into three sections: labor practices, environmental responsibility, and health and
safety.
Efficiency and waste reduction was also at the core of Lululemon’s Community Legacy initiative and overall
strategy. The five-year vision for this plan included a high level of product and process innovation to reduce
environmental pollutants in garment manufacturing and retailing. The company worked on implementing an internal
environmental guide and clause in the Workplace Code of Conduct for compliance by both Lululemon and its suppliers.
In addition to constant innovation of design, packaging and shipping processes were constantly scrutinized in order to
find the best possible way to decrease the company’s environmental impact. Lululemon also implemented measurement
tactics and benchmarks as indicators of the company’s environmental footprint, and to identify areas where
improvements could be made. Finally, Lululemon set up networks between itself and environmental experts and NGOs
to facilitate idea sharing about process and product improvements, and to foster ongoing conversations about corporate
social responsibility and environmental impact.
Green Buildings and Spaces was the final component of Lululemon’s Community Legacy initiative. The
company had a five-year vision for LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) designed buildings and
spaces for new construction, and motivated existing departments and retail locations to aim for zero waste and emissions
through the implementation of an internal building guide and the Building Code of Conduct; which encouraged paperless
communication along with recycling and paper reduction programs, natural building and maintenance materials
sourcing, and existing facility retrofitting for improved energy efficiency. Lululemon set a corporate goal of 95% zero
waste efficiency in operations by 2010.
Lululemon declared ‘social responsibility is our DNA’ and felt responsible to all stakeholders: employees,
customers, vendors, suppliers, stockholders, and the environment. Lululemon further supported its commitment to social
responsibility on its website: ‘It is who we are and what we do and we will continue to further our mission of creating
components for people to live longer, healthier and more fun lives... both for our guests, our employees, and our
manufacturing partners.’

Smartfiber AG, SeaCell®, and Vitasea®
Smartfiber AG was a small, privately held German company based in Rudolstadt, Germany, with fewer than 30
employees. In July 2007, Smartfiber AG took over SeaCell®, a competitor, to expand its research, production, and
marketing potential. Smartfiber AG developed, produced, and distributed the SeaCell® Lyocell fabric used in
Lululemon's Vitasea® products.
Based on the Lyocell system of combining SeaCell® with cellulose material, SeaCell® contained a skin
protective and anti-inflammatory seaweed additive. Lyocell was the seaweed fiber that was part of the SeaCell® fabric.
Smartfiber AG claimed that SeaCell® caused an active exchange between the seaweed fiber and the skin, which
activated wellbeing in those exposed to the fiber. The partnership between Lululemon and Smartfiber AG commenced in
2006 and the Vitasea® product line was born; made with 23% SeaCell®Pure, Smartfiber AG’s purest form of the
product. Smartfiber AG complied with Lululemon’s Workplace Code of Conduct and had potential to offer a new,
exiting relationship between the two companies: one built on environmental awareness, innovation, and trust.
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Smartfiber AG provided Lululemon with every piece of information it needed about the SeaCell® fabric. The
German company gave Lululemon information on the composition of SeaCell®, and the benefits of producing the
Vitasea® product line with the SeaCell® fabric. The clothing line, mainly shirts and some undergarments, was sold with
a product claim created by Lululemon and Smartfiber AG certifying that Vitasea® products release amino acids,
minerals and vitamins directly into the skin. Lululemon further marketed the product, with knowledge relayed by
Smartfiber AG, indicating that the vitamins and minerals released from Vitasea® products’ contact with skin would:
•

keep skin firm and smooth

•

prevent the skin from drying out

•

enhance blood supply to skin

•

activate cell metabolism

•

promote skin cell regeneration

•

contain anti-viral or anti-bacterial properties

•

sooth skin rashes

•

reduce stress

•

detoxify the skin
Lululemon employed its grassroots marketing efforts to communicate the benefits of Vitasea® products to

customers. Through company spokespersons, termed ‘Lululemon Ambassadors’, store employees termed ‘Educators’,
and corporate marketing efforts, Vitasea®’s product benefits were made known to all Lululemon customers. Vitasea®
products were priced at a premium compared to other Lululemon products. Vitasea® t-shirts were sold at an average
US$58, whereas other Lululemon t-shirts were priced at an average of US$48 per shirt. Vitasea® products represented
3% of Lululemon’s total product line, and accounted for approximately 1% of sales.

The investor’s tip
In late 2007, The New York Times, one of the largest newspapers in the world, received a tip about one of the
NASDAQ’s star performers: Lululemon. An anonymous investor, poised to short-sell the stock, tipped the newspaper of
Lululemon’s false Vitasea® product claims, and even had verification of the company’s dishonesty through independent
product testing. The investor explained that Chemir, an analytical lab specializing in investigational analytical chemistry,
tested the product and found no trace of seaweed in the product’s composition. Louise Story, a hedge-fund manager
assigned to business and finance articles for The New York Times was appointed to get to the bottom of both the
investor’s and Lululemon’s product claims.

The New York Times testing
Story researched Lululemon, Chemir, and Vitasea®. Her conversation with Carolyn J. Otten, director for specialized
services at Chemir Analytical Services, solidified the need to investigate the trendy, yoga-wear retailer. ‘seaweeds have
known vitamins and minerals, and we searched specifically for those vitamins, and we didn’t see them,’ stated Otten.
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With Chemir’s findings in its back corner, The New York Times ordered an independent test of Lululemon’s Vitasea®
fabric by the McCrone Group, a premier microscopy resource base in Westmont, IL. The newspaper arranged a lab test
of a blue Lululemon Vitasea® racer-back tank top composed of 70% cotton, 6% spandex, and 24% seaweed fiber to be
tested alongside a gray J. Crew t-shirt. The McCrone Group’s findings were less decisive than those of Chemir; the
laboratory could not rule out seaweed as part of the composition of the tank top, but also could not substantiate
Lululemon’s claims that seaweed was in fact part of the tank top’s composition.

The New York Times publication
The New York Times published the article, ‘“Seaweed” clothing has none, tests show,’ on the front page of the
newspaper’s business section on Wednesday, November 14, 2007. Story’s article saw immediate attention from
investors, analysts, fashion enthusiasts, and businesses alike. Prior to this date, Lululemon had been the poster-child for
social responsibility, community involvement, and hip, trendy clothing. The article’s publishing caused speculation
around Lululemon’s integrity and reputation. Some critics felt that The New York Times acted unethically, publishing the
article even though the tip came from an investor planning on shorting Lululemon’s stock. Others questioned
Lululemon’s ethics and product quality.

NASDAQ: LULU, TSX: LLL
The New York Times article sent shockwaves through investor circles. Since Lululemon’s initial public offering (IPO) on
the NASDAQ, the stock had seemed unstoppable. The stock climbed from US$36.87 to US$58.00 in just seven weeks.
Lululemon had also experienced similar increases in stock price on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The release of The New
York Times article had a negative effect on Lululemon’s stock. The stock price decreased 8% on November 14, 2007,
and continued to decline for the next several weeks.

Lululemon’s rebuttal
Before the article was published, Story spoke to Lululemon’s founder, Chip Wilson, about the Vitasea® fabric. ‘If you
actually put it on and wear it, it is different from cotton,’ Wilson stated. ‘That’s my only test of it.’ Wilson was confident
in the Vitasea® fabric, the supplier SmartFiber, and Lululemon’s brand name. Wilson’s and Lululemon’s strategy was to
ignore The New York Times article; however, a few short hours after publication, Lululemon executives and investors
watched the stock tumble, an unseen occurrence since Lululemon’s initial public offering a few months earlier. Shortly
after, Wilson and Meers quickly arranged for Lululemon to conduct an impromptu Vitasea® product test of their own.
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Lululemon’s tests
Lululemon contacted its partner, SGS Group (SGS), an independent, Switzerland-based inspection, verification, testing,
and certification company to conduct a special test on its Vitasea® products. An SGS lab in Hong Kong conducted the
test on the night of November 14, 2007, and came to the same result this time as it had when the previous Vitasea®
product testing was conducted in June 2007: the product contained Lyocell fibers consistent with Lululemon’s product
labels, based on special tests required to confirm the fiber’s existence. Smartfiber AG also provided Lululemon with a
statement supporting Lululemon’s product labels and the contents of the Vitasea® fabric: ‘SeaCell® is permanently
incorporated in the spun fiber we provide to Lululemon and is of the highest quality. In addition, we conduct our own
quality assurance procedures, including regular visits to production facilities, to ensure the manufacturer is producing
products in strict compliance with our specifications as well as Lululemon’s,’ declared Gerhard Neudorfer, Sales and
Marketing Director SeaCell® Fibers.
Lululemon announced on Thursday, November 15, 2007 at 9:00 pm ET via a press release that the content of
the Vitasea® product line was consistent with independent laboratory tests. The press release outlined the results of SGS
Groups’ tests on Vitasea® conducted in December 2006, June 2007, and November 2007, and included statements from
Lululemon supporting its Vitasea® clothing line and product claims. Meers further defended Lululemon’s findings and
brand: ‘Product quality and authenticity are of the utmost importance to Lululemon. Integrity goes to the core of
everything we do and is at the heart of our relationship with our guests. For this reason, we test our products for content
using a leading testing facility. We absolutely stand behind our products, our processes and refute any claims in recent
press reports to the contrary. Innovation and integrity are at the heart of Lululemon. We pride ourselves on innovative
and technical design. We are committed to continually bringing new and cutting edge products to the marketplace.’
Lululemon’s public relations tactic was received with mixed reviews. The press release earned the company
headlines such as ‘Lululemon says tests verify fabric’s properties’ and ‘Lululemon CEO says new seaweed clothing tests
should clear company’s name,’ but others were not as confident in Lululemon’s claims. Investors, media, and industry
critics concluded that Lululemon played with semantics in its press release, arguing that Lululemon, while contending
that the clothing did contain a fiber derived from seaweed, remained quiet about the truth regarding the Vitasea® product
claim: that the clothing releases amino acids, minerals, and vitamins directly into the skin.
Some Lululemon customers stood behind the brand’s products. Toronto shopper Irene Nava stated ‘I personally
do not care – I just love the pants. I wear them all the time. I have ones for running, ones for yoga, ones for outside.’
David Wilkinson echoed Nava’s comments, ‘I couldn‘t care less, because it is so comfortable.’ Others felt that
Lululemon had gone too far. Student Kristie Furlong, said ‘I would probably still buy the regular [products], but [the
Vitasea®] ones are more expensive, and I don‘t know that I would pay more anyway just for seaweed.’
The Lululemon brand name and reputation was now in question. The company had been known for its
sustainability practices, respect to the environment, and innovative processes, but was now the center of an international
controversy. Critics argued that the company should have just told the truth as it knew it, admitted that it made a mistake,
and notified the public of corrective action, rather than creating a press release to defend its product.

Canada’s government intervenes
After the article was published, the Competition Bureau of Canada, an independent Canadian law enforcement agency
that investigated complaints and monitored businesses for fair practices, contacted Lululemon’s corporate offices in
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Vancouver. On Friday, November 16, 2007, the Competition Bureau of Canada released a statement that Lululemon had
agreed to remove all therapeutic claims from its Vitasea® clothing line sold in all Canadian Lululemon stores. ‘The
Bureau acted quickly to resolve this issue of significant consumer and marketplace interest,’ said Andrea Rosen, Deputy
Commissioner of Competition. ‘Canadians are entitled to receive accurate information from businesses in order to make
informed purchasing choices.’
The Bureau outlined that Lululemon had to eliminate the following product attribute claims from its Vitasea®
clothing line:
•

remove all tags and/or representations on tags that contain unsubstantiated therapeutic and/or performance
claims of the Vitasea® technology from all stores across Canada;

•

remove all references to the Vitasea® technology from its website and any in-store advertising;

•

immediately inform all store managers and employees that they should not provide information on therapeutic
benefits and performance claims of the Vitasea® technology to customers; and
•

undertake a review of all promotional and marketing materials to ensure they comply with relevant legal
requirements.

Lululemon’s removal of the Vitasea® label
With pressure from the Competition Bureau of Canada, a falling stock price, and potential backlash from consumers,
Lululemon removed the label storewide. This included not only the Canadian stores over which the Competition Bureau
of Canada had jurisdiction, but Lululemon stores in the US, Japan, and Australia. The company was forced to remove all
of the current Vitasea® merchandise, re-educate the store employees and ambassadors about the change in the Vitasea®
product claims, redesign a new label, and manufacture all new Vitasea® products with the new claimless label.
How would those few days in November 2007 affect Lululemon’s strategy going forward? For a company like
Lululemon, fostered in creating a positive change in those that wear its clothing, the Vitasea® debacle was a huge
setback. Did The New York Times act unethically by publishing the Vitasea® article?
Did Lululemon perform due diligence in testing SmartFiber AG’s claims? With the myriad of suppliers Lululemon
currently employed – how many of them were also providing the company with false information that had not been
checked? Would Lululemon have to implement a random testing process to ensure the truth of its claims? Should
Lululemon continue to carry the Vitasea® line?
Lululemon had a huge mess to clean up: many stakeholders wanted explanations about both Lululemon’s
inadequate testing and Chip Wilson’s original comments to Louise Story of The New York Times. The holiday sales
season was right around the corner – how would Lululemon repair its tarnished image? Lululemon’s grassroots
marketing strategy focused on conveying a message of health, happiness, and environmental awareness through its
clothing to customers needed to be re-vamped – but how?
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Exhibit 1

Lululemon stores and locations

LULULEMON ATHLETICA INC.
LULULEMON STORES AND LOCATIONS
Corporate-Owned

Franchise

Stores

Total

Stores

Stores

Canada

37

3

40

United States

30

4

34

4

3

7

41

10

51

71

10

81

Total International
Overall total, as of
January 31, 2007
Overall total, as of
February 3, 2008
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Exhibit 2

Financial analysis, Lululemon Athletica, Inc.

2/3/2008

1/31/2007

Variance

COMMON

1/31/2007

1/31/2006

Variance

COMMON

SIZE
USD

USD

USD

%

Revenues

274,713,328

148,884,834

125,828,494

84.5%

Cost of goods sold

128,411,175

72,903,112

55,508,063

Gross Profit

146,302,153

75,981,722

Selling, general & administrative

96,177,348

52,539,998

Income (loss) from operations

50,124,805

Net income (loss)

30,842,439

SIZE
USD

USD

USD

%

100.0%

148,884,834

84,129,093

64,755,741

77.0%

100.0%

76.1%

46.7%

72,903,112

41,176,981

31,726,131

77.0%

49.0%

70,320,431

92.5%

53.3%

75,981,722

42,952,112

33,029,610

76.9%

51.0%

43,637,350

83.1%

35.0%

52,539,998

26,416,262

26,123,736

98.9%

35.3%

16,213,414

33,911,391

209.2%

18.2%

16,213,414

3,726,708

12,486,706

335.1%

10.9%

7,666,331

23,176,108

302.3%

11.2%

7,666,331

1,394,104

6,272,227

449.9%

5.1%

2/3/2008

1/31/2007

Variance

COMMON

1/31/2007

1/31/2006

Variance

USD

USD

USD

%

USD

USD

USD

%

Cash & Equivalents

53,339,326

16,028,534

37,310,792

232.8%

34.4%

16,028,534

-

-

-

22.2%

Receivables (ST)

4,431,556

2,290,665

2,140,891

93.5%

2.9%

2,290,665

-

-

-

3.2%

Inventories

39,092,208

26,628,113

12,464,095

46.8%

25.2%

26,628,113

-

-

-

36.8%

Current Assets

97,906,418

48,492,743

49,413,675

101.9%

63.1%

48,492,743

-

-

-

67.1%

INCOME STATEMENT

expenses

COMMON

SIZE

SIZE

BALANCE SHEET
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Net Property Plant & Equip

44,038,565

18,175,944

25,862,621

142.3%

28.4%

18,175,944

-

-

-

25.1%

Total Assets

155,092,142

72,293,109

82,799,033

114.5%

100.0%

72,293,109

-

-

-

100.0%

Accounts Payable

5,199,604

4,935,037

264,567

5.4%

12.2%

4,935,037

-

-

-

14.4%

Current Liabilities

35,821,551

31,938,590

3,882,961

12.2%

83.8%

31,938,590

-

-

-

93.0%

Total Liabilities

42,739,309

34,346,612

8,392,697

24.4%

100.0%

34,346,612

-

-

-

100.0%

Common stock

466,847

442,908

23,939

5.4%

0.4%

442,908

-

-

-

1.2%

Total Equity

112,034,009

37,378,798

74,655,211

199.7%

100.0%

37,378,798

-

-

-

100.0%

Profitability Ratios

2/3/2008

1/31/2007

Variance

%

1/31/2007

1/31/2006

Variance

%

ROA % (Net)

26.91

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

ROE % (Net)

40.95

41.02

-0.07

-0.2%

41.02

-

-

-

ROI % (Operating)

66.55

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

EBITDA Margin %

21.28

13.99

7.29

52.1%

13.99

7.36

6.63

90.1%

Calculated Tax Rate %

40.16

53.68

-13.52

-25.2%

53.68

62.63

-8.95

-14.3%

Revenue per Employee

101,556

-

-

-

-

-

-

Liquidity Indicators

2/3/2008

1/31/2007

Variance

%

1/31/2007

1/31/2006

Variance

%

Quick Ratio

1.61

0.57

1.04

182.5%

0.57

-

-

-

Current Ratio

2.73

1.52

1.21

79.6%

1.52

-

-

-

Net Current Assets % TA

40.03

22.9

17.13

74.8%

22.9

-

-

-

Asset Management

2/3/2008

1/31/2007

Variance

%

1/31/2007

1/31/2006

Variance

%

Total Asset Turnover

2.4

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Receivables Turnover

81.07

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Inventory Turnover

8.29

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Accounts Payable Turnover

53.77

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Accrued Expenses Turnover

18.19

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

RATIO ANALYSIS
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Property Plant & Equip Turnover

8.76

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Cash & Equivalents Turnover

7.86

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Per Share

2/3/2008

1/31/2007

Variance

%

1/31/2007

1/31/2006

Variance

%

Cash Flow per Share

0.57

0.39

0.18

46.2%

0.39

-

-

-

Book Value per Share

1.66

0.57

1.09

191.2%

0.57

-

-

-

Exhibit 3

Market information and dividends

LULULEMON ATHLETICA INC.
MARKET INFORMATION AND DIVIDENDS
Period End: Feb 03, 2008

Our common stock is quoted on the Nasdaq Global Select Market under the symbol "LULU" and on the Toronto
Stock Exchange under the symbol "LLL". Prior to July 27, 2007, there was no public market for our common
stock. The following tables sets forth, for the periods indicated, the high and low sales prices of our common
stock reported by the Nasdaq Global Select Market.
Common Stock Price
(Nasdaq Global Select Market)
High

Low

Second Quarter (from July 27, 2007)

$34.17

$24.92

Third Quarter

$60.70

$28.70

Fourth Quarter

$51.94

$25.00

Fiscal Year Ending February 3, 2008
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